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Lisa M. Fairfax* 
This Article not only argues that corporations must be encour-
aged to enhance the level of communication between shareholders 
and the board, but also maintains that the benefits of increased en-
gagement are significant enough that we should consider developing 
standards for incentivizing, if not mandating, more robust board-
shareholder engagement for corporations that fail to respond to such 
encouragement.  In the last several years, shareholders not only have 
gained increased authority over corporate elections and governance 
matters, but also have demonstrated a willingness to use that authority 
to challenge, and even reject, management policies and practices.  
Shareholders also have begun to demand increased communication 
with the corporation in general, and the board in particular.  This Ar-
ticle argues that corporations should be strongly encouraged, if not 
compelled, to meet that demand.  While acknowledging the potential 
pitfalls associated with increased board-shareholder engagement, this 
Article further argues that many of those pitfalls have been overstated, 
or can be minimized.  Moreover, in light of shareholders’ enhanced 
influence over corporate affairs, the costs associated with enhanced 
engagement may be outweighed by the benefits.  While it is not a pan-
acea, increased board-shareholder engagement has the potential to 
dramatically increase the corporation’s ability to promote under-
standing of its policies and programs, and otherwise avoid the nega-
tive repercussions of shareholder activism.  Thus, this Article endors-
es proposals that encourage corporations to increase board-
shareholder dialogue with two caveats.  First, given the menu of 
communicative options and the various judgment calls that must be 
made when implementing particular options, deference should be giv-
en to corporations and the board with respect to which option or op-
tions to adopt.  Second, the benefits of board-shareholder engagement 
are important enough that we should consider proposals that would 
more effectively incentivize and even mandate such engagement for 
 
 *  Leroy Sorenson Merrifield Research Professor of Law, The George Washington University 
Law School.  Special thanks for Nicola Sharpe, Cindy Williams, and the participants in the In the 
Boardroom symposium for their comments and insights on earlier versions of this draft.  All errors, of 
course, are mine. 
FAIRFAX.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 4/23/2013  1:43 PM 
822 UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 2013 
those corporations that refuse to answer the calls to increase their dia-
logue with shareholders. 
INTRODUCTION 
As shareholders have garnered increased influence over corporate 
affairs, they also have sought increased interaction with the corporation 
in general, and the board in particular.  Over the last several years share-
holders have advocated for, and obtained, significant influence over di-
rector elections, executive compensation issues, and corporate affairs 
more generally.1  Shareholders have used this influence to impact board 
structure as well as board composition, and even to reject corporate poli-
cies.2  Coinciding with their increased influence, shareholders not only 
have begun to demand increased engagement with the corporation, but 
also have begun to demand more robust engagement with directors.3 
This Article argues that corporations should accede to such de-
mands.  While some view board-shareholder engagement as crucial to 
promoting good corporate governance, there are others who continue to 
express concern with its value and desirability.4  Thus, although some 
corporations have been willing to increase their levels of board-
shareholder engagement,5 studies and anecdotal evidence suggest con-
tinued reluctance on the part of many corporate officers and directors, 
particularly with respect to increasing the level of interaction between 
the board and shareholders.6  To be sure, there exist both legal and prac-
tical hurdles associated with shareholder communication, particularly at 
the board level.  Effective communication involves a considerable time 
investment that part-time and overworked directors may be unable to af-
 
 1. See LISA M. FAIRFAX, SHAREHOLDER DEMOCRACY: A PRIMER ON SHAREHOLDER 
ACTIVISM AND PARTICIPATION 3–4 (2011) [hereinafter SHAREHOLDER DEMOCRACY]. 
 2. See Lisa M. Fairfax, Making the Corporation Safe for Shareholder Democracy, 69 OHIO ST. 
L.J. 53, 61–79 (2008) [hereinafter Making the Corporation Safe] (noting shareholder success in altering 
voting standards and annual election of directors); see also infra note 27 (discussing shareholders’ re-
jection of directors during the last several proxy season). 
 3. See Dangerous Talk? When/How Should Directors Communicate with Shareholders?, 
LATHAM & WATKINS (Latham &Watkins, San Diego, C.A.), at 1–2 [hereinafter Dangerous Talk], 
available at http://www.directorsforum.org/resources/pdf/cdf_dangerous_talk_program_outline_3-18. 
pdf?ID=3.362 (noting that activist-shareholders who perceive that directors are unwilling to act or be-
lieve that management has turned a deaf ear, now increasingly look to directors). 
 4. See ViewPoints: Advancing Board-Shareholder Engagement, TAPESTRY NETWORKS (Tapes-
try Networks, Ltd., London, U.K.), at 1 [hereinafter ViewPoints], available at http://www.tapestry 
networks.com/issues/corporate-governance/upload/Tapestry-ViewPoints-Advancing-board_share 
holder-engagment-30-May-2012.PDF (describing April 2012 discussions between large institutional 
investors and directors exploring the topic of board-shareholder engagement). 
 5. See id. at 2. 
 6. See id. at 5; see also STEPHEN DAVIS & STEPHEN ALOGNA, MILLSTEIN CTR. FOR 
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND PERFORMANCE, TALKING GOVERNANCE: BOARD-SHAREHOLDER 
COMMUNICATIONS ON EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION 5 (2008), available at http://www.uas.mx/ 
cegc/consilium/doc/talking-governance-CE0310.pdf (referring to two-way dialogue between boards 
and shareholders as rare); Brian V. Breheny, Can We Talk? The Continuing Demand for Shareholder 
Engagement, 14 CORPORATE GOVERNANCE REP., Apr. 4, 2011, at 1, 3. 
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ford.  Moreover, directors may not have sufficient knowledge to effec-
tively engage with shareholders.  Finally, some forms of engagement may 
trigger legal liability.7  This Article, however, insists that these concerns 
can be addressed and minimized, if not overcome.  More importantly, 
any potential disadvantages are far outweighed by the benefits to be 
gained from increasing board-shareholder engagement.  Indeed, share-
holders’ increased power translates into an increased ability to challenge 
or reject director-sponsored policies and programs.  By enhancing their 
engagement with shareholders, directors can better understand share-
holder attitudes, gain support for their own policies and practices, learn 
vital information about potential shareholder concerns, and ultimately 
avoid contentious battles with their shareholders.8  From this perspective, 
failing to effectively engage shareholders may be a more costly option 
than enhancing board-shareholder engagement. 
Thus, this Article concurs with calls to encourage such engagement, 
with two caveats.  First, while any such engagement must move beyond 
the traditional channels of communication, boards should not be com-
pelled to adopt any particular engagement strategy.  On the one hand, a 
careful assessment of the existing communication platforms reveals that 
such platforms may not offer an opportunity for meaningful dialogue be-
tween shareholders and directors; instead communication too often falls 
along two axes: rote and formulaic, or antagonistic, adversarial, and reac-
tive.9  Hence, any strategy for increasing board-shareholder communica-
tion must embrace alternative engagement mechanisms.  On the other 
hand, this Article does not endorse a particular mechanism.  Indeed, this 
Article points out that because there are potential benefits and draw-
backs to the array of new engagement proposals, and implementing any 
proposal involves resolving a host of thorny issues, boards should have 
the discretion to determine which proposal or proposals best meet their 
communicative needs.10 
The second caveat with this Article’s endorsement of proposals for 
enhancing board-shareholder engagement is that any such proposals 
should include consideration of strategies that would encourage, if not 
require, boards to be more proactive in this area.  Importantly, board-
shareholder engagement is not a cure-all.  It does, however, offer corpo-
rations the potential to diffuse hot-button issues before they transform 
into costly and distracting confrontations.11  Evidence suggests that some 
 
 7. For example, inappropriate communications between corporations and shareholders could 
result in liability under Regulation Fair Disclosure (Regulation FD), which makes it unlawful for cor-
porations and their agents to provide certain kinds of selective disclosure to shareholders.  See Selec-
tive Disclosure and Insider Trading, Securities Act Release No. 7881, Exchange Act Release No. 
43,154, Investment Company Act Release No. 24,599, 65 Fed. Reg. 51,716 (Aug. 24, 2000). 
 8. See infra Part II.A. 
 9. See ViewPoints, supra note 4, at 2. 
 10. See infra Part III.B.4. 
 11. See infra notes 99–103. 
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corporations may be avoiding board-shareholder engagement based on 
misconceptions or long-held, but misguided, aversions to board-
shareholder dialogue.12  To the extent such attitudes prevent those corpo-
rations from embracing more robust board-shareholder dialogue, this 
Article insists that it is appropriate to consider more proactive engage-
ment strategies ranging from incentives to potential mandates. 
Part I identifies the ways in which shareholder power has increased 
in recent years, and discusses how shareholders and others have argued 
that such increased power demands an increase in shareholder engage-
ment, particularly with the board.  Against this backdrop, Part II discuss-
es the benefits and drawbacks of shareholder engagement, concluding 
that any drawbacks are sharply outweighed by the benefits.  In light of 
this conclusion, Part III grapples with the best way for ensuring that en-
hanced board-shareholder engagement occurs.  First, Part III demon-
strates the need to move beyond the existing communication channels by 
illuminating the limitations with their inability to facilitate constructive 
dialogue between boards and shareholders.  Second, Part III examines 
some of the new proposals for enhancing board-shareholder communica-
tion, identifies their strengths and weaknesses, and demonstrates why the 
decision regarding which proposal to adopt is best left to the board’s dis-
cretion.  Finally, Part III explains why we should be prepared to consider 
strategies for further incentivizing, or even mandating, board-
shareholder engagement.  It is entirely possible that with the passage of 
time, many more corporate boards will step up their efforts to interact 
with shareholders.13  If this occurs, further reforms may be unnecessary.  
If it does not, however, we should be willing to consider alternative 
measures for ensuring appropriate board-shareholder engagement. 
I. SHAREHOLDER ACTIVISM AND CALLS FOR GREATER 
SHAREHOLDER ENGAGEMENT 
By way of background, this Part discusses the manner in which 
shareholder power has increased in recent years, and how that increase 
has spurred calls for increased shareholder engagement.  Corporate gov-
ernance scandals and the financial crisis not only caused many share-
holders to distrust corporate officers and directors, but also prompted 
shareholders to seek greater authority over corporate affairs.14  While 
there is significant disagreement about the benefits of increased share-
 
 12. See ViewPoints, supra note 4, at 6; infra note 83. 
 13. See Proxy Season 2012: Board Priorities for Shareholder Engagement, PROXY PERSPECTIVES 
(Ernst & Young, London, U.K), Feb. 2012, at 1,  available at http://www.ey.com/Publication/vwLU 
Assets/Proxy_season_2012:_board_priorities_for_shareholder_engagement_(Proxy_perspectives)/$ 
FILE/Proxy%20season%202012%20board%20priorities.pdf (noting that the 2012 proxy season re-
vealed that more boards are communicating with their shareholders). 
 14. See Lucien Arye Bebchuk, The Case for Increasing Shareholder Power, 118 HARV. L. REV. 
833, 842–43 (2005) [hereinafter Increasing Shareholder Power]; Making the Corporation Safe, supra 
note 2, at 55. 
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holder influence,15 many shareholders and advocates of increased share-
holder power believe it is necessary to serve as a check against manageri-
al malfeasance or board inattention.16  In their view, if shareholders have 
greater authority over boards and their decisions, there is a greater like-
lihood that boards will pay heed to their obligations to more closely and 
carefully monitor corporate affairs, while making decisions that are in 
the best interest of the corporation and its shareholders.17  As a result of 
this view, shareholders have waged an aggressive battle to gain more in-
fluence over directors and corporate affairs.18  This battle has resulted in 
victories on a number of fronts.  Section A examines those victories, 
while Section B reveals how they have spurred calls for increased en-
gagement at the board level. 
A. Shareholder Activism and the Emergence of  
Increased Shareholder Power 
1. Majority Voting 
Shareholders have recently achieved significant success in their bat-
tle to implement majority voting.  Only a few years ago, the vast majority 
of public company directors were elected based upon a plurality system 
whereby a director was elected so long as that director received a plurali-
ty of the votes cast, without counting votes withheld or cast against.19  In 
an uncontested election, a plurality voting system means that directors 
can be elected so long as they receive any votes cast in their favor, even if 
a majority of shareholders vote against a director or otherwise withhold 
their votes.20  Amidst concerns that plurality voting could undermine the 
impact of shareholder votes, shareholders began advocating for majority 
voting.21  Majority voting refers to a system whereby directors must re-
ceive a majority of the shareholder vote in order to be elected to the 
board.22  In 2005, when shareholders began their majority voting cam-
paign, less than 150 companies had a majority voting system.23  As a re-
sult of shareholder activism, by 2010 more than seventy-seven percent of 
 
 15. See Stephen M. Bainbridge, Director Primacy and Shareholder Disempowerment, 119 HARV. 
L. REV. 1735, 1745 (2006) [hereinafter Director Primacy]; William W. Bratton & Michael L. Wachter, 
The Case Against Shareholder Empowerment, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 653, 666–67 (2010). 
 16. See SHAREHOLDER DEMOCRACY, supra note 1, at 37–39; Increasing Shareholder Power, su-
pra note 14, at 870. 
 17. See SHAREHOLDER DEMOCRACY, supra note 1, at 37–39; Increasing Shareholder Power, su-
pra note 14, at 870. 
 18. See Making the Corporation Safe, supra note 2, at 55. 
 19. See CLAUDIA H. ALLEN, STUDY OF MAJORITY VOTING IN DIRECTOR ELECTIONS 10 n.9 (last 
updated Nov. 20, 2007), available at http://www.ngelaw.com/files/uploads/documents/majoritystudy111 
207.pdf (noting that a “relatively limited” number of corporations had majority voting prior to 2006). 
 20. See SHAREHOLDER DEMOCRACY, supra note 1, at 85. 
 21. See id. at 88–90. 
 22. See William K. Sjostrom, Jr. & Young Sang Kim, Majority Voting for the Election of Direc-
tors, 40 CONN. L. REV. 459, 472 (2007). 
 23. See ALLEN, supra note 19, at 10 n.9. 
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S&P 500 companies adopted some form of majority voting system for 
their director elections.24 
Majority voting augments shareholders’ ability to impact board 
elections and board decision-making.  A majority voting regime increases 
the likelihood that shareholders will have the ability to unseat incumbent 
directors or prevent new directors from holding office.25  Such a regime 
also enhances the impact of withhold the vote campaigns.  A withhold 
the vote or vote no campaign refers to a campaign seeking to encourage 
shareholders to withhold their vote or vote against a particular director 
or group of directors.26  Shareholders have demonstrated an increased 
willingness to wage such campaigns, collaborating to target hundreds of 
directors, signaling their displeasure at such directors’ performance or 
policies.27  Under a plurality system, however, such campaigns may be 
merely symbolic because even when shareholders withhold a majority of 
their votes against a director, a director retains her board seat.28  Under a 
majority vote system, however, such campaigns could significantly jeop-
ardize a director’s ability to serve on the board.  To the extent the threat 
of losing a board seat impacts board behavior, majority voting increases 
shareholders’ ability to influence board behavior. 
2. Broker Voting 
Shareholder activism also has prompted changes to the broker vot-
ing rules.  A considerable number of public company investors purchase 
their shares through a broker who then holds the shares in an account for 
 
 24. Noam Noked, 2011 Annual Corporate Governance Review, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON 
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND FIN. REG. (Jan. 12, 2012, 9:28 AM), http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/ 
corpgov/2012/01/12/2011-annual-corporate-governance-review/.  As of June 2008, more than sixty per-
cent of Fortune 500 companies had some form of majority voting.  See SHAREHOLDER DEMOCRACY, 
supra note 1, at 90. 
 25. Under most majority voting systems a director does not automatically lose her seat as a re-
sult of a failure to receive a majority of the shareholder vote.  Instead, the director either must tender 
her resignation which the board must then decide whether to accept, or the director remains in office 
for some time period until the board selects a new director.  See SHAREHOLDER DEMOCRACY, supra 
note 1, at 90–91.  Hence, shareholders do not have absolute control over the election outcome.  Never-
theless, a majority voting regime increases shareholders’ ability to directly and indirectly impact board 
elections.  See id. 
 26. See Joseph A. Grundfest, Just Vote No: A Minimalist Strategy for Dealing with Barbarians 
Inside the Gates, 45 STAN. L. REV. 857, 908 (1993). 
 27. See TED ALLEN ET AL., INSTITUTIONAL S’HOLDER SERVS., PRELIMINARY 2011 U.S. 
POSTSEASON REPORT 3–4 (2011).  During 2009 and 2010, eighty-nine and eighty-seven directors, re-
spectively, did not earn majority support.  Id. at 14.  During 2011, only forty-three directors received 
less than majority support.  Id.  The ISS report attributed this decline to the implementation of say on 
pay and its impact on shareholder voting.  See id.  Importantly, however, the past few proxy seasons 
have also revealed that even when directors receive majority support, there are many directors who 
receive a high level of shareholder dissent. 
 28. There are some governance experts who believe that withhold the vote campaigns impact 
director elections even without majority voting.  See Grundfest, supra note 26, at 908.  Moreover, at 
least one study confirms this belief.  See Diane Del Guercio et al., Do Boards Pay Attention When In-
stitutional Investor Activists “Just Vote No”?, 90 J. FIN. ECON. 84, 85–86 (2008). 
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shareholders’ benefit.29  Under federal and securities exchange act rules, 
brokers can cast votes for shares held in their accounts (1) if they do not 
receive shareholder voting instructions within ten days of the sharehold-
er meeting, and (2) if the vote relates to a matter deemed routine.30  Be-
cause uncontested elections were deemed routine, brokers were able to 
cast uninstructed votes in such elections.  Empirical evidence revealed 
that broker discretionary voting could account for as much as twenty 
percent of the total vote in such elections.31  Moreover, studies indicate 
that broker discretionary voting overwhelmingly follows management.32  
Hence, shareholders contended that such voting distorted election out-
comes and undermined shareholder influence.33  As a result, shareholders 
began advocating for the prohibition of uninstructed broker voting in un-
contested elections.34  In 2009, the Securities and Exchange Commission 
(SEC) abolished discretionary voting in uncontested elections,35 and in 
2010 the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act 
(the Dodd-Frank Act) codified that abolition into law and extended it to 
prohibit such voting in connection with certain other compensation mat-
ters.36  Studies reveal that in some elections, if broker discretionary vot-
ing had not been allowed, the election result would have been more con-
sistent with shareholder preferences.37  Thus, like majority voting, the 
ban on broker discretionary voting could have a considerable impact on 
shareholders’ ability to influence director elections and corporate af-
fairs.38 
3. Classified Boards 
Shareholder activism surrounding classified boards has led to 
changes that could impact shareholders’ ability to influence director elec-
tions and corporate affairs.  If a corporation has a staggered or classified 
 
 29. See SHAREHOLDER DEMOCRACY, supra note 1, at 23–24. 
 30. See id. at 24. 
 31. CTR. ON EXEC. COMP., A CALL FOR CHANGE IN THE PROXY ADVISORY INDUSTRY STATUS 
QUO: THE CASE FOR GREATER ACCOUNTABILITY AND OVERSIGHT 5 (2011), available at http:// 
online.wsj.com/public/resources/documents/ProxyAdvisoryWhitePaper02072011.pdf. 
 32. See Bernard S. Black, Shareholder Passivity Reexamined, 89 MICH. L. REV. 520, 560–61 
(1990). 
 33. See LARRY W. SONSINI ET AL., REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE PROXY WORKING 
GROUP TO THE NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE 14 (June 5, 2006) [hereinafter PROXY WORKING 
GROUP REPORT], available at http://www.nyse.com/pdfs/PWG_REPORT.pdf.   
 34. Id. at 7–8. 
 35. Order Approving Proposed Rule Change, Exchange Act Release No. 60,215, 74 Fed. Reg. 
33,293 (July 1, 2009). 
 36. See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 
§ 957, 124 Stat. 1376, 1906 (2010). 
 37. See PROXY WORKING GROUP REPORT, supra note 33, at 9. 
 38. However, at least one study questions the impact of the recently changed broker voting rules.  
Although it only studied a limited time-frame, the study indicated that the new rules did not appear to 
have any impact on director approval ratings.  See Ali Akyol et al., The Elimination of Broker Voting: 
Much Ado About Nothing?, 2–3 (Dec. 15, 2011) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://ssrn. 
com/abstract=1973558.   
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board, shareholders only elect a portion of the board each year.39  Share-
holders have sought board declassification for decades, but only recently 
have their efforts proved successful.40  A 2010 study indicated that seven-
ty-two percent of boards elect directors annually, up from forty percent a 
decade ago.41  Declassifying a board enables shareholders to replace the 
entire board in one election cycle, enhancing their power over board 
elections. 
4. Proxy Access 
New proxy access rules also have the potential to enhance share-
holders’ influence.  Proxy access refers to the ability to include share-
holder nominated candidates on the corporation’s proxy statement.42  In 
August 2010, after considerable debate and pressure from the investment 
community, the SEC passed proxy access rules for the first time in its his-
tory.43  These rules granted shareholders two routes for obtaining proxy 
access.  First, subject to certain conditions, the SEC mandated proxy ac-
cess by requiring every public company to grant shareholders who held 
at least three percent of a company’s voting securities for at least three 
years the right to nominate a candidate of their choice onto the corpora-
tion’s proxy statement.44  Second, the SEC allowed shareholders to pro-
pose bylaw amendments related to specific procedures for proxy access.45  
Such bylaws enabled shareholders to create their own proxy access re-
quirements so long as they were not more restrictive than the rules relat-
ed to mandated proxy access.46  In July 2011, however, the D.C. Circuit 
overturned the provision in the rules mandating proxy access.47  The D.C. 
Circuit left untouched the portion of the rules enabling shareholders to 
propose bylaw amendments requesting corporations to implement spe-
cific procedures for proxy access.48  The most recent proxy data indicates 
that shareholders have taken advantage of their ability to submit proxy 
 
 39. See SHAREHOLDER DEMOCRACY, supra note 1, at 80–81. 
 40. Compare Increasing Shareholder Power, supra note 14, at 854 (showing evidence of share-
holder support for board declassification, coupled with evidence of company’s refusal to change board 
structure), with SPENCER STUART, 2010 SPENCER STUART BOARD INDEX 14 (25th ed. 2010), available 
at http://content.spencerstuart.com/sswebsite/pdf/lib/SSBI2010.pdf (showing dramatic increase in de-
classified boards). 
 41. See SPENCER STUART, supra note 40, at 4, 14.  Another study reveals only twenty-nine per-
cent of companies in the S&P 500 have classified boards, as compared to sixty percent in 2000.  See 
John J. Madden, The Shifting Landscape of Corporate Governance, and Four Steps Boards Should 
Take in an Era of Shareholder Ascendancy, 14 CORPORATE GOVERNANCE REP., Feb. 7, 2011, at 2 (cit-
ing shark repellent study). 
 42. See SHAREHOLDER DEMOCRACY, supra note 1, at 129. 
 43. Facilitating Shareholder Director Nominations, Securities Act Release No. 9136, Exchange 
Act Release No. 62,764, Investment Company Act Release No. 29,384, 75 Fed. Reg. 56,668 (Sept. 16, 
2010). 
 44. See id. 
 45. See id. 
 46. See id. 
 47. See Bus. Roundtable v. SEC, 647 F.3d 1144, 1148–51 (D.C. Cir. 2011). 
 48. Id. at 1153. 
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access proposals, with some success.49  Thus, several shareholders have 
submitted proxy access proposals, and a few corporations have agreed to 
support proxy access at their companies.50 
While there is significant debate regarding the potential impact and 
propriety of a proxy access rule,51 shareholders contend that proxy access 
is vital to their ability to influence election outcomes and corporate prac-
tices.52  Prior to the SEC’s proxy access rules, federal law prohibited 
shareholders from nominating candidates of their choice onto the corpo-
ration’s proxy statement.53  Instead, only management-supported candi-
dates appeared on the proxy statement.54  If shareholders wanted to elect 
a different set of candidates they had to wage a proxy contest by creating 
and distributing a separate proxy statement to shareholders.55  Evidence 
suggests that the expense associated with such an endeavor proved pro-
hibitive for all but a few shareholders.56  As a result, most directors ran 
unopposed, undermining shareholders’ ability to impact board candidate 
decisions.57  Shareholders view proxy access as a cost-effective way for 
them to have a greater voice in the board nomination and election pro-
cess.58 
5. Say on Pay 
Shareholders also have experienced success in their efforts to play a 
greater role in compensation decisions.  In the 2010 Dodd-Frank Act, 
Congress mandated say on pay—a shareholder advisory vote on execu-
tive compensation.59  The mandate requires that every public corporation 
give its shareholders a say on pay vote, and that such corporations give 
 
 49. See Considerations for Public Company Directors in the 2012 Proxy Season, GIBSON DUNN, 
(Gibson, Dunn, & Crutcher LLP, New York, N.Y.), Jan. 3, 2012 (noting that at least fifteen companies 
have received proxy access proposals as June 2012). 
 50. See id.; see also Adam Piore, US Proxy Season’s Mid-Year Trends, INSIDE INVESTOR 
RELATIONS (July 24, 2012), http://www.insideinvestorrelations.com/articles/proxy-voting-annual-
meetings/18867/us-proxy-seasons-mid-year-trends/ (noting that Hewlett-Packard agreed to implement 
proxy access in 2013 for shareholders who own at least five percent of the company’s shares; and that 
at least two dozen companies had received proxy access proposals). 
 51. See SHAREHOLDER DEMOCRACY, supra note 1, at 129–33. 
 52. Id. at 129–30. 
 53. See Shareholder Proposals, 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8(i)(8) (2007); see also SHAREHOLDER 
DEMOCRACY, supra note 1, at 128. 
 54. SHAREHOLDER DEMOCRACY, supra note 1, at 128. 
 55. See id.  Shareholders could also recommend a director candidate to the board’s nominating 
committee or attend the annual meeting to nominate a candidate, but neither alternative is likely to 
result in enabling shareholders to nominate a candidate of their choice to the board. 
 56. See Facilitating Shareholder Director Nominations, Securities Act Release No. 9136, Ex-
change Act Release No. 62,764, Investment Company Act Release No. 29, 384, 75 Fed. Reg. 56,668 
(Sept. 16, 2010); Lucian A. Bebchuk, The Myth of the Shareholder Franchise, 93 VA. L. REV. 675, 681–
91(2007) [hereinafter Shareholder Franchise]. 
 57. See Shareholder Franchise, supra note 56, at 688–89. 
 58. Facilitating Shareholder Director Nominations, 75 Fed. Reg. at 56,668. 
 59. See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111–203, 
§ 951(a)(1), 124 Stat. 1376, 1899 (2010). 
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shareholders a “say on frequency”—the ability to determine whether 
such a vote would occur annually, every other year, or once every three 
years.60  Anecdotal and empirical evidence reveal that say on pay en-
hances shareholders’ ability to influence corporate pay practices in at 
least two respects.  First, such votes appear to lead to increased interac-
tion between shareholders and directors thereby increasing shareholders’ 
ability to influence decisions regarding the executive pay.61  Second, the 
votes increase the extent to which executive pay is aligned with perfor-
mance in a manner approved by shareholders.62 
6. Shareholder Activism and Shareholder Influence 
Through each of these reforms, shareholders garnered increased in-
fluence over director elections in particular, and corporate affairs more 
generally.  Importantly, shareholder influence not only directly impacts 
board membership, but also directly impacts policies over which direc-
tors have primary, if not sole, responsibility.  As Section B will explain, 
shareholders’ increased power related to these and other matters has re-
percussions for the importance of emphasizing board-shareholder en-
gagement. 
B. Connecting Shareholder Activism with Shareholder Engagement 
Historically, shareholder engagement has not been a top priority of 
directors and officers.  Studies reveal that twenty-five years ago, the topic 
of shareholder communication had not yet surfaced.63  Shareholders were 
relatively passive, with neither the resources nor the inclination to seek 
to actively impact corporate governance.64  Moreover, shareholders did 
not have many mechanisms at their disposal to influence corporate af-
fairs.65  As a result, few shareholders demanded interaction with corpora-
tions or the board.66  Similarly, the board felt no significant compulsion to 
engage shareholders outside of their fairly routine presence at the annual 
meeting.67 
 
 60. Id. § 951(a)(1)–(2).  
 61. See Jeffrey N. Gordon, “Say on Pay”: Cautionary Notes on the U.K. Experience and the Case 
for Shareholder Opt-In, 46 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 323, 337–40 (2009); Stephen Davis, Does ‘Say on Pay’ 
Work?: Lessons on Making CEO Compensation Accountable 16 (2007) (unpublished manuscript) (on 
file with the Millstein Center for Corporate Governance and Performance, Yale School of Manage-
ment); Fabrizio Ferri & David A. Maber, Say on Pay Votes and CEO Compensation: Evidence from 
the UK (unpublished manuscript), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id= 
1420394 (citing say on pay regulations in the U.K.). 
 62. See Davis, supra note 61, at 15. 
 63. See SPENCER STUART, supra note 40, at 3. 
 64. See id. 
 65. See id. 
 66. See id. at 4. 
 67. See id. at 3. 
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Increased shareholder activism, however, has led them to demand 
greater engagement, particularly with the board.68  A recent survey re-
vealed that a significant number of investors sought greater engagement 
with the board.69  Shareholders and their advocates have proposed a 
range of different strategies for increasing their interactions with board 
members from annual corporate governance calls with directors, to peri-
odic “investor days” at the corporation spearheaded by directors.70 
The SEC has indicated its support for increased communication be-
tween the board and its shareholders.  The SEC recently dedicated a sec-
tion of a concept release to issuer communication with shareholders, not-
ing that many commentators have stressed the increased need for 
corporations to be able to communicate with their shareholders.71  The 
SEC sought guidance on ways to enhance the ability of corporations to 
effectively and efficiently communicate with shareholders,72 making clear 
that increased engagement should begin with board-shareholder com-
munication.73  Thus, in 2010, the SEC called for corporations to make 
board-shareholder engagement a priority.74  SEC Chair Mary Schapiro 
implored directors to have “clear conversations with investors about how 
the company is governed.”75 
Along these same lines, several corporate governance experts and 
organizations have advocated making effective board-shareholder en-
gagement a priority.  To be sure, calls to prioritize shareholder engage-
ment are not new.  As early as 1992, Martin Lipton proposed that boards 
implement a process to meet annually with their largest shareholders.76  
Such a proposal was central to an overall proposal to strengthen board 
accountability and thereby enhance corporate governance.77  Calls to pri-
oritize board-shareholder engagement, however, have increased within 
the last few years.  In 2003, the National Association of Corporate Direc-
 
 68. See Breheny, supra note 6, at 48. 
 69. See Aarti Maharaj, Governance During ‘Shareholder Spring,’ CORP. SEC’Y (May 31, 2012), 
http://www.corporatesecretary.com/articles/corporate-secretary-week/12246/governance-during-share 
holder-spring/ (noting that ninety-two percent of shareholders have called for more engagement with 
the board); FTI CONSULTING, SHAREHOLDER VOICE GROWING LOUDER IN THE BOARDROOM: 
RESULTS OF FTI CONSULTING’S SECOND ANNUAL CORPORATE GOVERNANCE INVESTOR SURVEY 3 
(2012), available at http://www.shareholderforum.com/e-mtg/Library/20120412_FTI-survey.pdf (find-
ing that ninety-four percent of shareholders are calling for more engagement with the chairman of the 
board). 
 70. See ViewPoints, supra note 4, at 8–9. 
 71. See Concept Release on the U.S. Proxy System, 75 Fed. Reg. 42,982, 42,998–99 (proposal 
July 22, 2010) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 240, 270, 274, 275).  
 72. See id. at 42,998. 
 73. See id. at 43,000. 
 74. See Mary L. Schapiro, Chairman, SEC, Remarks at the NACD Annual Corporate Govern-
ance Conference (Oct. 19, 2010), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/2010/spch101910 
mls.htm. 
 75. See id. 
 76. See Martin Lipton & Jay W. Lorsch, A Modest Proposal for Improved Corporate Govern-
ance, 48 BUS. LAW. 59, 74 (1992). 
 77. Id. at 61. 
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tors (NACD) established a task force on improving board-shareholder 
communications.78  By 2008, a small group of corporations, corporate 
governance experts, and business organizations such as the Business 
Roundtable signed a set of guidelines, known as the Aspen Principles, 
urging greater board shareholder communication.79  In 2009, the Com-
mittee on Capital Markets recommended that boards consult with share-
holders on a range of governance matters.80  That same year, an Ameri-
can Bar Association (ABA) task force recommended that boards 
“[e]mbrace their role as the body elected by the shareholders to manage 
and direct the corporation by . . . affirmatively engaging with sharehold-
ers to seek their views.”81  These efforts underscore a growing recognition 
that the new era of shareholder power requires more interaction between 
directors and shareholders. 
II. THE VALUE OF ENHANCED SHAREHOLDER COMMUNICATION IN 
AN ERA OF ENHANCED SHAREHOLDER POWER 
While there is a growing recognition of the importance of board-
shareholder communication, there is no clear consensus on its benefits.82  
Instead, some express skepticism regarding its value,83 while surveys re-
veal continued reluctance on the part of corporate directors and officers 
to increase engagement with shareholders, particularly at the board lev-
el.84  To be sure, increased engagement is not a panacea, nor does it guar-
antee positive outcomes.  This Part insists that the costs associated with 
such engagement may have been over-emphasized, however, while the 
benefits may have been under-appreciated. 
A. The Benefits of Engagement 
Shareholders’ increased voice in corporate affairs makes sharehold-
er engagement a priority for several reasons.  First, it is increasingly im-
portant for the corporation to better understand shareholder concerns so 
that they can either better incorporate such concerns into their policies 
 
 78. See COUNCIL OF INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS & NAT’L ASS’N OF CORPORATE DIRS., 
FRAMEWORK AND TOOLS FOR IMPROVING BOARD-SHAREHOLDER COMMUNICATIONS (2004) [here-
inafter FRAMEWORK AND TOOLS], available at www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/s71903/nacd030904-
attach.pdf. 
 79. See ASPEN INST., LONG-TERM VALUE CREATION: GUIDING PRINCIPLES FOR 
CORPORATIONS AND INVESTORS (2007), available at http://www.aspeninstitute.org/sites/default/files/ 
content/docs/business%20and%20society%20program/FINALPRINCIPLES.pdf. 
 80. See DAVIS & ALOGNA, supra note 6, at 9. 
 81. See Holly Gregory, Excerpts from Report of the Task Force of the ABA Section of Business 
Law Corporate Governance Committee on Delineation of Governance Roles & Responsibilities, in 
SEVENTH ANNUAL DIRECTOR’S INSTITUTION ON CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 107, 120 (2009). 
 82. See Dangerous Talk, supra note 3, at 2–3; ViewPoints, supra note 4, at 6 (noting some direc-
tors’ aversion to enhanced engagement); see also Breheny, supra note 6, at 3. 
 83. See supra note 82 and accompanying text. 
 84. See Breheny, supra note 6, at 3. 
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and practices or otherwise be better equipped to respond to those con-
cerns.85  For example, evidence reveals that some corporations have 
reached out to shareholders to determine their views regarding compen-
sation issues and ensure that their pay practices incorporate such views.86  
In this respect, shareholder engagement enables corporations and the 
board to fashion policies and practices that better reflect shareholder in-
terests. 
Second, enhanced shareholder engagement gives corporations the 
ability to educate their shareholder base.87  Such engagement provides 
corporations with the opportunity to explain their perspective and poli-
cies in a manner that could prevent misunderstandings.88  It also enables 
the board to provide information to shareholders so that they can make 
more informed decisions.89  Given that shareholders now have a voice 
over a range of corporate governance decisions,90 this educational role is 
vital. 
Third, shareholder engagement enables corporations to generate 
support for their policies, as well as support for the directors and officers 
who shape and approve those policies.91  In an era where shareholders 
have an increased ability to reject corporate pay packages92 and unseat 
directors,93 ensuring such support is clearly vital.  Indeed, recent proxy 
data reveals that one crucial difference between companies that have 
won shareholder support for their policies and those that have failed, is 
companies’ willingness to engage directly with shareholders.94  As a 
Wachtell Lipton memo recently noted, “no technique is more effective in 
winning the vote than direct shareholder outreach.”95 
Fourth, engaging with shareholders could generate goodwill among 
the shareholder base that creates allies that may help repel takeovers or 
efforts from those seeking to threaten or undermine corporate policies.  
 
 85. See SHAREHOLDER DEMOCRACY, supra note 1, at 115–16, 122. 
 86. See ALLEN ET AL., supra note 27, at 2. 
 87. See SHAREHOLDER DEMOCRACY, supra note 1, at 124; IRA M. MILLSTEIN ET AL., WEIL 
GOTSHAL, TEN THOUGHTS FOR ORDERING GOVERNANCE RELATIONSHIPS IN 2010, at 2 (Jan. 2010) 
[hereinafter TEN THOUGHTS], available at http://tinyurl.com/Weil10Thoughts; see also REINHART 
INSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR SERVS. E-ALERT, ENHANCED SHAREHOLDER RIGHTS UNDER DODD-
FRANK: TOOLS FOR ENSURING THAT PROXY VOTES ARE INFORMED AND INDEPENDENT 2 (MAR. 27, 
2011) [hereinafter ENHANCED SHAREHOLDER RIGHTS], available at http://www.reinhartlaw.com/ 
Publications/Documents/ea_20110527%20RIIS.pdf. 
 88. SHAREHOLDER DEMOCRACY, supra note 1, at 115. 
 89. See id. at 123; see also ENHANCED SHAREHOLDER RIGHTS, supra note 87, at 2; TEN 
THOUGHTS, supra note 87, at 2. 
 90. See supra Part I.A (noting shareholders’ increased voice in board elections and executive 
pay). 
 91. See Dangerous Talk, supra note 3, at 2. 
 92. See supra Part I.A (noting impact of say on pay). 
 93. See supra Part I.A (noting shareholders’ ability to impact board elections because of majori-
ty voting, broker voting, proxy access, and classified board exchanges). 
 94. See Jeremy L. Goldstein et al., Say on Pay 2012, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORPORATE 
GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG. (July 14, 2012, 10:28 AM), http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/corpgov/2012/ 
07/14/say-on-pay-2012/#more-30571. 
 95. See id. 
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Indeed, if shareholder engagement increases the likelihood that share-
holders will view management and their policies favorably, it also reduc-
es the ability of other shareholders and even proxy advisory firms to in-
fluence the actions of their existing shareholder base.  In other words, 
effective shareholder engagement can translate into shareholder support 
in times of turmoil. 
Fifth, shareholder engagement enables corporations and the board 
to have a better appreciation for future issues, and therefore be better 
prepared to tackle potential problems that may arise with such issues.96 
Ultimately, shareholder engagement may enable corporations to 
avoid costly confrontations with shareholders.  Some governance experts 
suggest that much of shareholder activism could be avoided with effec-
tive shareholder engagement.97  This is because shareholder activism of-
ten reflects an effort to gain the attention of directors deemed to have ig-
nored their concerns.98  Consistent with this perspective, one proxy  
advisory firm representative emphasized that such firms do not target 
companies that engage in constructive dialogue with their shareholders.99  
Proxy advisory firm representatives also have indicated that even when 
boards do not implement particular processes, the fact that they have en-
gaged in open dialogue with shareholders reduces the likelihood of 
shareholder actions against them.100  Hence, increased shareholder en-
gagement seems to be an obvious and even critical response to increased 
shareholder power.101 
B. Assessing and Debunking the Costs of Engagement 
1. Regulation FD 
Existing research suggests that many corporate officers and direc-
tors view Regulation Fair Disclosure, known as Regulation FD, as a sig-
nificant obstacle to more robust shareholder communication.102  Adopted 
in 2000, Regulation FD was designed to promote full and fair disclosure 
of important issues, and thus prohibit corporations from selectively dis-
 
 96. See TEN THOUGHTS, supra note 87, at 1 (encouraging board-shareholder communication 
because of its ability to “get out ahead” of issues). 
 97. See Dangerous Talk, supra note 3, at 2 (noting one experts belief that “almost every hot but-
ton governance issue can be addressed through constructive communication between boards and man-
agement with shareholders”). 
 98. See DAVIS & ALOGNA, supra note 6, at 6. 
 99. See Action Plan to Engage Shareholders, Improve Board Composition, NACD 
DIRECTORSHIP (Dec. 21, 2010), http://www.directorship.com/action-plan-to-engage-shareholders-
improve-board-composition/. 
 100. See id. 
 101. See Madden, supra note 41, at 4–5 (noting that to proactively respond to the shifting govern-
ance landscape, corporations must constructively engage with shareholders). 
 102. See DAVIS & ALOGNA, supra note 6, at 5; FRAMEWORK AND TOOLS, supra note 78, at 9.   
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closing information in a manner that could result in insider trading.103  
Regulation FD requires that when a public company or someone acting 
on its behalf discloses material nonpublic information to market profes-
sionals or its shareholders who may trade on the information, the com-
pany must publicly disclose such information.104  Corporations therefore 
must be mindful of Regulation FD in all of their communications with 
shareholders, particularly communications with selective shareholders or 
communications during meetings that are not open to the public.  Studies 
indicate that concern over potential violations of Regulation FD under-
mines corporations’ willingness to enhance their engagement with share-
holders.105 
In 2010 the SEC issued interpretive guidance on Regulation FD 
aimed at allaying such concerns.106  The SEC emphasized that Regulation 
FD does not prohibit corporate directors and officers from engaging in 
private meetings with shareholders.  In order to ensure that corporations 
do not convey material nonpublic information during such meetings, the 
SEC recommended that corporations implement procedures governing 
private meetings with shareholders such as pre-clearing discussion topics 
with counsel, or having counsel participate in the meetings.107  The SEC 
further pointed out that corporations can discuss material nonpublic in-
formation with shareholders so long as such shareholders expressly agree 
to keep the information confidential.108  Finally, even if corporations in-
advertently disclose material nonpublic information, they can avoid vio-
lating Regulation FD by promptly disclosing the information to the pub-
lic.109  In its adopting release, the SEC noted that technological advances 
had made it much easier to broadly disseminate information, and thus 
corporations have a variety of different ways in which they can comply 
with their disclosure obligations under Regulation FD.110  The SEC’s in-
terpretative guidance confirmed that corporations could satisfy these ob-
ligations by posting information on the corporation’s website.111  In sum, 
the SEC has tried to make clear that with appropriate planning Regula-
tion FD should not deter corporate dialogue with shareholders. 
 
 103. Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, Securities Act Release No. 7881, Exchange Act 
Release No. 43,154, Investment Company Act Release No. 24,599, 65 Fed. Reg. 51,716 (Aug. 24, 
2000). 
 104. See id. at 51,719. 
 105. See supra note 102 and accompanying text. 
 106. See Regulation FD, SEC (last updated June 4, 2010), http://www.sec.gov/divisions/corpfin/ 
guidance/regfd-interp.htm.  
 107. See id. 
 108. See id. 
 109. See id. 
 110. Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, Securities Act Release No. 7881, Exchange Act 
Release No. 43,154, Investment Company Act Release No. 24,599, 65 Fed. Reg. 51,716 (Aug. 24, 
2000). 
 111. See Regulation FD, supra note 106. 
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Experts also have suggested that corporate concerns related to 
Regulation FD may be overstated.112  Indeed, the SEC has identified sev-
en categories of information or events that have an increased potential to 
be deemed material, and corporate governance matters are not so identi-
fied.113  Thus, experts contend that there is a reduced likelihood that the 
information about which shareholders are most concerned will run afoul 
of Regulation FD.114  Only the SEC can bring an action under Regulation 
FD, there is no private right of enforcement.115  Studies reveal less than 
ten Regulation FD enforcement actions, and no enforcement action or 
investigation related to companies that have had or are planning to have 
private meetings with shareholders.116  Thus, the SEC—through guidance 
and its enforcement practice—appears to have made clear its intent not 
to use Regulation FD to chill shareholder communication with boards, 
potentially reducing concerns about the impact of Regulation FD. 
Moreover, companies seeking to engage with shareholders have 
adopted many of the procedures recommended by the SEC, which in 
turn has enabled them to avoid potential legal liability while having con-
structive conversations with their shareholders.117  These procedures in-
clude: (a) developing an agenda limited to publicly available infor-
mation,118 (b) ensuring that legal counsel is present at any shareholder 
meeting,119 (c) pre-approving topics for the meeting,120 (d) providing a 
publicly-available record or transcript of the meeting,121 and (e) encour-
aging shareholders to sign nondisclosure agreements.122 
Thus, both corporate experience and regulator inaction suggest that 
while corporations must be mindful of Regulation FD, it should not serve 
as a major impediment to communication with shareholders.  Govern-
ance experts note that corporations have over-emphasized the obstacle 
presented by Regulation FD, with some even suggesting that boards may 
be using Regulation FD as a “crutch” to avoid speaking with sharehold-
ers.123 
 
 112. See ViewPoints, supra note 4, at 5; see also MARC GOLDSTEIN, THE STATE OF ENGAGEMENT 
BETWEEN U.S. CORPORATIONS AND SHAREHOLDERS: A STUDY CONDUCTED BY INSTITUTIONAL 
SHAREHOLDER SERVICES FOR THE INVESTOR RESPONSIBILITY RESEARCH CENTER INSTITUTE 20 
(2011), available at http://www.irrcinstitute.org/pdf/IRRC-ISS_EngagementStudy.pdf. 
 113. Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, 65 Fed. Reg. at 51,716. 
 114. See DAVIS & ALOGNA, supra note 6, at 10. 
 115. Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, 65 Fed. Reg. at 51,726. 
 116. See DAVIS & ALOGNA, supra note 6, at 10. 
 117. See id. 
 118. See SHAREHOLDER DEMOCRACY, supra note 1, at 126; ENHANCED SHAREHOLDER RIGHTS, 
supra note 87, at 4. 
 119. See sources cited supra note 118. 
 120. See sources cited supra note 118. 
 121. See sources cited supra note 118. 
 122. See sources cited supra note 118. 
 123. See GOLDSTEIN, supra note 112, at 20 (noting one asset manager’s assertion that Regulation 
FD concerns were “more of an excuse cited by issuers than an actual obstacle”); ViewPoints, supra 
note 4, at 5. 
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2. Grandstanding? 
Some directors may be concerned that shareholder activists will use 
any additional board-shareholder meetings simply as a means of being 
disruptive or grandstanding, and thus may not truly have an interest in 
meaningful communication.124  To be sure, there is a lot of anecdotal evi-
dence suggesting that often the few people who attend annual meetings 
do so in order to be disruptive.125  These anecdotes support the notion 
that shareholder meetings have become, in one expert’s words, a 
“[t]heater of the [a]bsurd.”126  Such anecdotes also may undermine direc-
tors’ desire to engage in shareholder dialogue beyond the status quo. 
Such evidence should not be used to condone all forms of board-
shareholder meetings, however.  First, it is clear that some shareholder 
groups are serious about effective communication, and legitimately de-
sire to dialogue with the board.127  Second, shareholder behavior at the 
annual meeting is not a useful proxy for determining how shareholders 
will conduct themselves in other settings.  This is because, as will be dis-
cussed in Part III, the annual meeting is not a useful platform for en-
gagement.  Most issues are settled prior to the meeting.128  This may 
make it more likely that shareholders who attend the meeting will en-
gage in symbolic, if not confrontational, tactics.  Hence, such behavior 
 
 124. See Christina Rexrode, The Loudest Shareholder Activist Ready for a Break, USA TODAY, 
http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/money/media/story/2012-07-13/evelyn-y-davis-gadfly-retires/56203956 
/1 (last updated July 13, 2012, 5:03 PM) (noting concern that activist shareholders make a “mockery of 
shareholder advocacy” by “grandstanding for attention” rather than “talking about the issues”); see 
also James Kristie, The Fix is In, DIRS. & BDS., First Quarter 2011, at 6, available at http:// 
www.shareholderforum.com/e-mtg/Library/2011Q1_Directors%20&%20Boards-articles.pdf (noting 
that annual meetings are often hijacked by the “shout and yell of gadflies”); David Shaw, The Direc-
tors and Boards Survey: The Effectiveness of Annual Meetings, DIRS. & BDS., First Quarter 2011, at 36, 
available at http://www.shareholderforum.com/e-mtg/Library/2011Q1_Directors%20&%20Boards-
articles.pdf (noting the perceived “hijacking of meetings”). 
 125. See Josh Harkinson, Wells Fargo Turns Away Its Own Shareholders From Its Shareholder 
Meeting, MOTHER JONES (Apr. 24, 2012, 2:28 PM), http://www.motherjones.com/mojo/2012/04/wells-
fargo-turns-away-its-own-shareholders-annual-meeting (discussing strategy of targeting shareholder 
meetings, and actions by some 2000 shareholders of blocking entrances and inflating a smoking rate in 
front of the site of the annual meeting); Rexrode, supra note 124 (discussing shareholder who pur-
chases stock in various companies for the primary reason of attending annual meetings and heckling 
CEOs, shouting at other shareholders, and bringing “entertainment value” to the meetings); Ann 
Saphir & Tom Polansek, Annual Meeting Disrupted by Activist Shareholders, CHI. TRIB. (May 23, 
2012), http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2012-05-23/news/sns-rt-cmeannual-meeting--update-1l1e8gnh 
u4-20120523_1_cme-group-cme-s-executive-chairman-exchange-operator (noting annual meeting dis-
ruption resulting from shareholders shouting and clapping at meeting headquarters); see also Suzanne 
McGee, ‘Shareholder Spring?’ Protesters Roil Annual Meetings, FISCAL TIMES, May 10, 2012, available 
at http://www.thefiscaltimes.com/Columns/2012/05/10/Shareholder-Spring-Protesters-Roil-Annual-
Meetings.aspx#page1 (describing shareholder antics at various companies). 
 126. Carl T. Hagberg, What to do About the Annual Meeting?, DIRS. & BDS., First Quarter 2011, 
at 25, 27. 
 127. See Shaw, supra note 124, at 38 (noting that shareholders raised pay questions at the annual 
meeting); Dangerous Talk, supra note 3, at 1 (noting shareholders’ increased desire to discuss govern-
ance issues); GOLDSTEIN, supra note 112, at 5, 16 (pinpointing shareholder engagement over various 
governance topics). 
 128. See Hagberg, supra note 126, at 26. 
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should not be used to negate the utility of board-shareholder communi-
cation; instead, it tends to support the assertion that such communication 
must occur outside of the boundaries of the annual meeting to be effec-
tive. 
3. No Good Deed . . . 
Some may object to increased shareholder engagement based on 
the potential for such engagement to go awry.  Importantly, studies sug-
gest that boards and shareholders have differing perspectives regarding 
what constitutes effective engagement as well as what constitutes a suc-
cessful engagement.129  These differing perspectives create the potential 
that shareholder engagement could produce negative results.130  Indeed, 
ineffective engagement could increase shareholder frustration and dis-
content with corporate officers and directors.131  This is particularly true if 
shareholders have no desire for true engagement, but instead want to use 
interactions with directors to advance their own personal agenda, or oth-
erwise act as a corporate gadfly. 
This possibility should not prevent corporations from seeking to fur-
ther their engagement efforts, however.  Rather, it underscores the need 
for careful planning and preparation.  Fortunately, not only have corpo-
rations begun to identify best practices for such planning and prepara-
tion, but there are many examples of companies that have experienced 
success when employing those practices.132  Because the potential for 
negative outcomes can be minimized, corporations should not rely on 
that potential to prevent them from taking advantage of the clear bene-
fits of increased board-shareholder engagement. 
4. Board Specific Objections 
Importantly, even those who acknowledge the need for increased 
engagement with shareholders raise several objections to engagement at 
the board level. 
a. Resource Constraints 
As an initial matter, one may object to board-shareholder commu-
nication based on the notion that directors may not have the time and re-
sources to devote to effective shareholder engagement.  Successful and 
 
 129. See Breheny, supra note 6, at 3; ViewPoints, supra note 4, at 5; see also GOLDSTEIN, supra 
note 112, at 3, 22–26. 
 130. See GOLDSTEIN, supra note 112, at 22.  The report notes that issuers are “happy to talk, but 
investors want to see concrete action.”  Id.  Such a divergent view of success may mean that investors 
become frustrated when dialogue does not move beyond simply talking while boards may view the 
dialogue as successful in itself and thus may not necessarily see a need to take specific actions. 
 131. See SHAREHOLDER DEMOCRACY, supra note 1, at 116. 
 132. See id. at 125–26; see also GOLDSTEIN, supra note 112, at 28; ViewPoints, supra note 4, at 7–8. 
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effective engagement can take a considerable amount of time.  Studies 
reveal that such engagement can last anywhere from a week to more 
than a month.133  Timing concerns are particularly acute at the board lev-
el.  A recent study of engagement found that all respondents reported re-
source and time considerations as the most significant impediment to en-
gagement.134  Indeed, recent reforms impose additional responsibilities on 
directors that require them to devote considerably more time to their di-
rector duties.135  Given that the vast majority of directors are not em-
ployed by the companies on whose board they serve, and thus only serve 
on the board in a part-time capacity,136 it may be both impractical and in-
appropriate to impose even more responsibilities on directors, and ex-
pect that they can effectively carry out those responsibilities. 
The observation regarding time constraints is valid, and any reform 
should appropriately consider whether directors have the capacity for ef-
fective performance.  It is entirely possible, however, that effective 
board-shareholder engagement could enable directors to conserve valu-
able time and resources, or otherwise ensure that directors are not com-
pelled to expend additional resources unnecessarily.  Indeed, anecdotal 
evidence suggests that directors’ failure to effectively communicate with 
shareholders could cause shareholders to reject corporate policies, 
prompting directors to devote added resources toward those policies to 
regain the support of shareholders.137  This suggests, in turn, that proac-
tive engagement can save valuable time and resources. 
b. The Need for Consistency 
Some may object to board-shareholder communication based on the 
corporations’ need to speak with one voice.  In essence, objectors might 
argue that it is important for the corporation to have a unified voice to 
demonstrate a shared commitment to corporate goals as well as stability 
within the corporation.138  That voice, because of informational ad-
vantages, has historically been management and not the board.139  In fact, 
it is possible that when boards speak directly with shareholders, boards 
may create distance between directors and managers or otherwise cause 
dissension that may frustrate the board’s ability to work productively 
 
 133. See GOLDSTEIN, supra note 112, at 4. 
 134. See id. at 20. 
 135. See SPENCER STUART, 2011 SPENCER STUART BOARD INDEX 26–27 (26th ed. 2011), available 
at http://content.spencerstuart.com/sswebsite/pdf/1:6/SSBI_2011_final.pdf (noting increase in board 
meetings and time commitment associated with board duties in 2011, post Dodd-Frank and other fi-
nancial reforms). 
 136. Id. at 14. 
 137. See Piore, supra note 50. 
 138. See Lissa Perlman, The Best Way to Lead: One Voice and a Consistent Message, DIRS. & 
BDS., Second Quarter 2010, at 25, 25. 
 139. See James Kristie, Who Speaks for the Board?, DIRS. & BDS., Second Quarter 2010, at 18 
(noting that the longstanding tradition of the corporation has been that the corporation speaks with 
one voice—management). 
FAIRFAX.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 4/23/2013  1:43 PM 
840 UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 2013 
with management.140  Moreover, increased communication between di-
rectors and shareholders could lead to inconsistent and conflicting mes-
sages regarding the corporation’s goals and practices.141 
The increasing trend towards focusing on board independence, cou-
pled with the trend toward emphasizing board responsibility to oversee 
management, means that interaction with management can no longer be 
deemed to be a proxy for interaction with the board.142  Instead, share-
holders increasingly have been encouraged to view directors as an inde-
pendent voice and as a check on managerial behavior and policies.143  Re-
forms ranging from mandates of director independence on board 
committees to calls for separation of the position of board chair and the 
CEO both embody and solidify the belief that directors are supposed to 
act independently from managers.144  This changed understanding of the 
directors’ role increases shareholders’ desire to communicate directly 
with directors because it encourages shareholders to view them as a sep-
arate and distinct voice.145 
c. Informational Disadvantage 
Some also may suggest that shareholder engagement with the board 
is not necessary because boards have an informational disadvantage vis-
á-vis other corporate actors.  That is, boards do not have sufficient un-
derstanding of corporate affairs to handle such engagement.146  Instead, 
corporations may be deemed to have many other actors who are better 
equipped to interact with shareholders.147  First, most large public corpo-
rations devote significant resources to their investor relations depart-
ment148 that presumably has the expertise necessary to field investor que-
ries.  Hence, one may contend that the bulk of shareholder 
communication should fall on their shoulders.  Second, corporate secre-
taries also have increasingly played a role in interacting with sharehold-
ers and keeping abreast of their concerns.149  Studies reveal that such sec-
 
 140. See Perlman, supra note 138, at 25. 
 141. See id. 
 142. See Karen Kane, Communicating by Proxy is No Longer Enough, DIRS. & BDS., Second 
Quarter 2010, at 28. 
 143. See id. 
 144. See Jay W. Lorsch, Expectations Have Changed, DIRS. & BDS., Second Quarter 2010, at 18. 
 145. See Kane, supra note 142, at 28. 
 146. See Lorsch, supra note 144, at 18. 
 147. See GOLDSTEIN, supra note 112, at 15 (noting the number of actors who initiate engagement 
at corporations). 
 148. See Alexander V. Laskin, Investor Relations Practices at Fortune 500 Companies: An Explor-
atory Study, in THE IMPACT OF PR IN CREATING A MORE ETHICAL WORLD: WHY CAN’T WE ALL 
GET ALONG? 241, 246–247 (2005), available at http://www.academia.edu/870724/Investor_ 
Relations_Practices_at_Fortune_500_Companies_An_Exploratory_Study. 
 149. See SOC’Y OF CORPORATE SEC’YS & GOVERNANCE PROF’LS, COMPENSATION SURVEY 
REPORT 25 (2009); SOC’Y OF CORPORATE SEC’YS & GOVERNANCE PROF’LS, RESPONSIBILITIES OF 
THE CORPORATE SECRETARY’S OFFICE 8, 12–13 (2001) [hereinafter RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE 
CORPORATE SECRETARY’S OFFICE].  
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retaries play a critical role in corporate-shareholder engagement, manag-
ing shareholder communications and acting as a liaison between the 
board and shareholders.150  Finally, senior officers, particularly the CEO, 
are responsible for the day-to-day affairs of the corporation,151 and thus 
they may be better positioned to both address and respond to sharehold-
er concerns.152  Arguably, all of these actors are better-informed than the 
board, and hence they should be responsible for any engagement with 
shareholders.  By contrast, directors may have very little firsthand 
knowledge of everyday corporate affairs, making them less-equipped to 
effectively interact with shareholders.153 
This relative informational disadvantage may mean that requiring 
directors to interact with shareholders could have negative repercussions.  
If directors must respond to queries about which they have no 
knowledge, their lack of knowledge could fuel shareholder discontent by 
fostering an image that directors are ill-informed regarding critical cor-
porate governance matters. 
These concerns may support the need to be cautious with respect to 
board-shareholder engagement, as well as the need for engagement to 
occur at other levels.  Any engagement should occur after careful consid-
eration and assessment of the issues to be discussed.  Engagement also 
should only occur when directors are fully informed regarding such is-
sues.  Finally, directors and management should distinguish between 
those issues that are most appropriate for directors to address and those 
that are best addressed by other actors. 
Directors, however, should not be excused from the conversation al-
together, particularly because the informational disadvantage that may 
normally be present with respect to directors may not exist in the context 
of the kinds of issues around which shareholders are most likely to want 
engagement.  To be sure, not every issue is appropriate for board-level 
engagement.  Yet, many of the issues about which shareholders are most 
interested are precisely those that are most appropriate for the board to 
discuss.  A Spencer Stuart study revealed that shareholders are most in-
terested in discussing compensation issues and topics related to board 
composition and structure such as majority voting, board-chair inde-
pendence, potential directors, and classified boards.154  Consistent with 
this interest, corporate governance experts almost universally agree that 
appropriate topics for board-shareholder communications include issues 
 
 150. See RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE CORPORATE SECRETARY’S OFFICE, supra note 149. 
 151. Corporate Laws Comm., ABA Section of Bus. Law, Corporate Director’s Guidebook, 66 
BUS. LAW. 975, 985 (2011) [hereinafter Corporate Director’s Guidebook]. 
 152. See Lorsch, supra note 144, at 18; see also Norman R. Augustine, Malice in Wonderland, 
BOARDROOM BRIEFING, Fall 2005, at 8, 8. 
 153. See Lorsch, supra note 144, at 18. 
 154. See SPENCER STUART, supra note 40, at 31; see also SPENCER STUART, 2009 SPENCER 
STUART BOARD INDEX 27 (2009), available at http://content.spencerstuart.com/sswebsite/pdf/lib/ 
SSBI2009.pdf.   
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such as executive compensation and board compensation and structure.155  
Indeed, reforms have made boards—as distinct from any other corporate 
actor—increasingly responsible for such issues.156  This suggests that is-
sues of most concern to shareholders are those issues that fall within the 
purview of the board’s responsibility, making directors uniquely qualified 
to engage with shareholders on such issues.  As a result, governance ex-
perts have noted that a “communications approach that relies exclusively 
on management is increasingly disfavored.”157 
5. Objections Based on Increasing Shareholder Power 
Some may object to increased board-shareholder engagement be-
cause it expands shareholders’ role, and hence power over corporate af-
fairs.  Such an objection would be similar to the general objections being 
made concerning the broader effort to increase shareholder power.158  At 
its core, opponents of engagement contend that increased shareholder 
power undermines the efficiency of the board-centric model of the cor-
porate form, while increasing the likelihood that shareholders with spe-
cial interests will advance their personal agenda at the expense of the 
long-term interests of the corporation and the broader shareholder 
class.159  This objection cannot be used to undermine the validity of a 
proposal for increased board-shareholder communication.  First, regard-
less of the merits of such an objection, the fact that shareholders have 
gained increased power within the corporation makes it largely academic 
at this point.  Second, to the extent that increased board-shareholder en-
gagement can be used to alleviate some of the negative repercussions of 
increased shareholder power, opponents of that increase should support 
such engagement.  Shareholders’ increased power gives them the ability 
to act in ways that may have significant and negative repercussions for 
the corporation and the board.160  Effective communication with share-
 
 155. See FRAMEWORK AND TOOLS, supra note 78, at 14; Ira M. Millstein et al., Rethinking Board 
and Shareholder Engagement in 2008 (Jan. 2008), available at http://www.weil.com/news/pubdetail. 
aspx?pub=6382 (noting that boards “are well-advised to be open to shareholder communications on 
topics that bear on board quality and attention to shareholder value”). 
 156. See supra Part II. 
 157. See ALAN L. BELLER ET AL., CLEARY GOTTLIEB, BOARD FOCUS 2010: ISSUES AND 
DEVELOPMENTS 9 (2010), available at http://www.cgsh.com/files/News/c4421659-91ea-4b7e-a660-3cb0 
a0faffd3/Presentation/NewsAttachment/fbb0e902-6619-4557-a5d5-3dc38f3125c5/CGSH%20Alert%20-
%20Board%20Focus%202010.pdf. 
 158. See SHAREHOLDER DEMOCRACY, supra note 1, at 39–42; see also Stephen M. Bainbridge, 
The Case for Limited Shareholder Voting Rights, 53 UCLA L. REV. 601, 624 (2006) [hereinafter Share-
holder Voting Rights]; Bratton & Wachter, supra note 15, at 666–67; Director Primacy, supra note 15, 
at 1746. 
 159. See SHAREHOLDER DEMOCRACY, supra note 1, at 39–42. 
 160. For example, shareholders can use their say on pay power to reject executive pay packages, 
which many corporations seek to avoid.  See ALLEN, supra note 19, at 5.  Shareholders also can use 
proxy access to nominate and ultimately elect directors to the board who may have goals and interests 
at-odds with existing board and management, while the changes with regard to classified boards means 
that shareholders may be able to unseat an entire board in one election cycle.  See supra Part I.A.  
Shareholders also can withhold their votes against directors, and in a governance world in which cor-
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holders has the potential to address this phenomenon.  Thus, board-
shareholder communication is vital precisely because shareholders have 
increased power. 
C. Concluding Assessment 
This Part demonstrates that while there are potential costs associat-
ed with board-shareholder engagement, they may have been overstated.  
Moreover, those costs must be balanced against the potential benefits of 
such engagement, which are significant.  While it is certainly no panacea, 
current evidence strongly suggests that board-shareholder engagement 
can be a powerful antidote for the potential ills that can occur when 
shareholders are frustrated by the lack of effective communication with 
corporate boards.161  Hence, such engagement should be a priority for all 
corporations and their boards. 
III. CRAFTING SOLUTIONS FOR ENHANCED ENGAGEMENT 
If board-shareholder engagement should be prioritized, what should 
such engagement look like?  This Part responds to this query in three 
parts.  First, this Part argues that such engagement must move beyond 
traditional channels of communication.  After assessing the potential al-
ternatives, however, this Part argues that the decision regarding which 
alternative to adopt is best left to the discretion of the board.  Third, this 
Part maintains that we should at least consider proposals that would 
more properly incentivize those corporations that fail to enhance their 
engagement efforts. 
A. The Existing Communication Regime and Its Shortcomings 
This Section demonstrates that the existing channels of communica-
tion are inadequate for promoting constructive dialogue, and hence ar-
gues that alternative channels must be adopted.  Traditionally, the annu-
al meeting, proxy statement, and shareholder proposal process 
represented the primary, if not exclusive, methods of communication be-
tween shareholders and the corporation/board.162  While each of these 
methods is important, none of them is particularly conducive to construc-
tive dialogue between boards and shareholders.163  Although technology 
has enhanced the ability of boards and shareholders to communicate, 
 
porations have increasingly embraced majority voting, such withholding power can lead to directors 
losing their seat on the board.  See SHAREHOLDER DEMOCRACY, supra note 1, at 89–90.   
 161. See supra note 160 and accompanying text; see also supra Part II.A. 
 162. See SHAREHOLDER DEMOCRACY, supra note 1, at 63–65 (discussing the shareholder meet-
ings and proposal process); David Silverman, Open Your Mindset to the Bigger Picture,  DIRS. & BDS., 
First Quarter 2011, at 33. 
 163. See infra Part III.A.1–3. 
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such technological advances do not appear to overcome the shortcom-
ings of the current communication apparatus.164 
1. The Annual Meeting 
Although the annual meeting is the primary, if not sole, setting in 
which shareholders have the opportunity to interact with directors face-
to-face,165 it is not an ideal setting for constructive dialogue for a host of 
reasons.  First, effective engagement with concerned shareholders may 
not be feasible because most shareholders in public corporations are dis-
persed and hence do not attend the annual meeting in person; instead 
they attend and vote by proxy.166  As a result, it is not clear that engage-
ment at the annual meeting would reach the appropriate audience.167  
Second, the effectiveness of any engagement effort is undermined by the 
fact that most shareholders vote by proxy, and thus most shareholders 
will already have cast their vote prior to the annual meeting date.168  
Third, the fact that most issues are resolved prior to the annual meeting, 
and that most shareholders do not attend the annual meeting, increases 
the likelihood that those who attend the annual meeting may do so for 
symbolic reasons related to expressing their discontent, rather than to 
promote meaningful dialogue.169  Fourth, the very fact that the annual 
meeting requires shareholders to vote increases the likelihood that such 
meetings will be contentious.  In other words, the high stakes nature of 
some director elections and other matters to be voted on during the an-
nual meeting may create a tense and contentious atmosphere that is not 
conducive to meaningful communications.  Finally, because there may be 
a number of important matters on the annual meeting agenda, it may be 
difficult for shareholders and the board to focus meaningfully on other 
business during the annual meeting.170  Thus, the annual meeting is not an 
ideal environment for constructive discussion between directors and 
shareholders. 
2. Proxy Statements and Disclosure Documents 
Clearly the proxy statement and other relevant disclosure docu-
ments serve as one of the first lines of communication between share-
 
 164. See infra Part III.A.4. 
 165. See Hoschett v. TSI Int’l Software, Ltd., 683 A.2d 43, 45–46 (Del. Ch. 1996) (noting that the 
shareholder meeting represents a forum for deliberation and confrontation); Elizabeth Boros, Virtual 
Shareholder Meetings: Who Decides How Companies Make Decisions?, 28 MELB. U. L. REV. 265, 268 
(2004).  
 166. See SHAREHOLDER DEMOCRACY, supra note 1, at 127. 
 167. See Hagberg, supra note 126, at 26. 
 168. See SHAREHOLDER DEMOCRACY, supra note 1, at 127–28. 
 169. See Hagberg, supra note 126, at 26. 
 170. See Shaw, supra note 124, at 38 (revealing that most communications with shareholders at 
the annual meeting occurs through speeches and reports). 
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holders and directors.171  Because most shareholders do not attend the 
annual meeting in person, the corporate proxy statement has taken the 
place of the annual meeting as the primary platform through which pub-
lic corporations communicate with their shareholders.172  Such communi-
cation through disclosure documents is valuable precisely because it is 
written and allows for more nuanced and thoughtful explanations of 
board positions.173  As a result, such communication may reduce share-
holder concerns and anxiety that could lead to increased activism.  Im-
portantly, shareholders’ enhanced power has caused corporations and 
boards to place renewed emphasis on ensuring that their disclosure doc-
uments are more informative and understandable.174 
Disclosure, however, cannot be the only mode of communication, 
particularly because it is not a two-way dialogue.  Disclosure does not al-
low shareholders to respond to directors or otherwise provide their in-
sights and perspectives on corporate policies in a way that may allow 
boards to take such matters into account.  Most experts agree that disclo-
sure is a necessary, but not sufficient, component of board-shareholder 
engagement.175  Instead, communication through disclosure documents 
serves as a critical complement to more constructive board-shareholder 
dialogue. 
3. The Shareholder Proposal Process 
The shareholder proposal process plays a critical role in the current 
communication environment.  By introducing proposals on particular 
topics, shareholders signal to the corporation the issues about which 
shareholders are concerned, while their vote reflects the strength of 
shareholder support for such issues.176  Most importantly, shareholder 
proposals often serve as an important starting point in a dialogue be-
tween corporations and shareholders around pivotal issues.177  From this 
perspective, the proposal process has played an important role in share-
holder engagement. 
Like the proxy statement and disclosure documents more generally, 
the proposal process may be an important component of board-
shareholder engagement, but it is not sufficient on its own.  To be sure, 
the proposal process is critical.  Often the mere submission of a share-
holder proposal prompts more detailed and meaningful dialogue be-
 
 171. See TEN THOUGHTS, supra note 87, at 2 (noting that “shareholder communications start with 
the company’s public filings”). 
 172. See SHAREHOLDER DEMOCRACY, supra note 1, at 63. 
 173. See BELLER ET AL., supra note 157, at 82 (noting that corporations can use disclosure related 
to compensation to communicate the company’s story “succinctly and in plain English”).   
 174. See TEN THOUGHTS, supra note 87, at 2; see also supra note 13 and accompanying text. 
 175. See TEN THOUGHTS, supra note 87, at 2. 
 176. See SHAREHOLDER DEMOCRACY, supra note 1, at 63–65. 
 177. See id. 
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tween shareholders and the corporation.178  It has important limitations, 
however.  First, the proposal process does not allow for significant inter-
action between the board and shareholders.  Instead, the formal proposal 
process involves shareholders submitting a proposal and the board offer-
ing its response.179  Such a process is a very limited form of two-way dia-
logue.  Second, the proposal process is a very blunt engagement vehicle 
because when shareholders submit proposals they are limited to five 
hundred words, which does not allow for shareholders to pinpoint nu-
ances in the concerns they raise through the proposal process and other-
wise have more detailed explanations regarding their concerns.180  In this 
regard, the proposal process may be an important starting point for en-
gagement, but cannot be the sole mechanism for engagement. 
4. Internet-Based Communications 
Outside of the annual meeting and disclosure documents, technolo-
gy has greatly enhanced a corporation’s ability to communicate with 
shareholders.  Every major corporation has a website that conveys criti-
cal information to shareholders.181  Many corporations also have blogs 
and Twitter accounts.182  Corporations use such devices to facilitate on-
going communication with their shareholders. 
Corporations also can participate in electronic shareholder forums.  
In 2008, the SEC passed rules aimed at facilitating the use of electronic 
shareholder forums.183  Such forums can take many forms from websites 
to blogs, but are essentially platforms that allow shareholders and corpo-
rations to communicate through the Internet.184  The SEC’s 2008 rules 
were designed to facilitate the use of electronic shareholder forums by 
removing some of the hurdles associated with such use.185  The SEC be-
lieved that electronic shareholder forums could provide a cost-effective 
means of more routine communications among shareholders and be-
tween shareholders and the corporation.186 
Unfortunately, these technologies have been limited in their use and 
utility.  First, it does not appear that corporations have used electronic 
shareholder forums in any significant manner.187  Second, it appears that 
 
 178. See id. 
 179. See Shareholder Proposals, 17 C.F.R. § 240.14(a)-8(m) (2007). 
 180. See id. § 240.14a-8(d). 
 181. See SHAREHOLDER DEMOCRACY, supra note 1, at 121. 
 182. See id. 
 183. See Electronic Shareholder Forums, Exchange Act Release No. 57,172, Investment Company 
Act Release No. 28,124, 73 Fed. Reg. 4450 (Jan. 25, 2008).   
 184. See id. at 4451, 4457. 
 185. See id. 
 186. See id. at 4451, 4455. 
 187. See Melissa Klein Aguilar, Online Shareholder Forums Slow to Catch On, COMPLIANCE 
WEEK (Sept. 23, 2008), http://www.complianceweek.com/pages/login.aspx?returl=/online-shareholder-
forums-slow-to-catch-
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devices such as blogs and Twitter accounts have been used primarily as 
bulletin boards or announcement platforms,188 and thus do little to pro-
mote two-way dialogue between shareholders and the corporation.  Such 
a use is understandable given the public nature of such vehicles.  Regard-
less, such use reveals that corporate communication through the Internet 
may do little to enhance thoughtful discourse between corporations and 
their shareholders. 
5. Virtual Shareholder Meetings 
Technology has expanded the extent to which shareholders and 
corporations can interact during the annual meeting.  Most corporations 
not only broadcast their annual meetings through the web, but also allow 
shareholders to participate remotely.189  Some corporations even host 
remote-only or virtual shareholder meetings, pursuant to which all 
shareholders participate in the meeting remotely.190  During such meet-
ings, corporations provide a mechanism for shareholders to submit ques-
tions before or during the annual meeting.191  Modern technology has in-
creased the potential for shareholder engagement during the annual 
meeting. 
 This remote interaction, however, does not appear to support con-
structive dialogue between directors and shareholders.  In fact, share-
holders have been extremely resistant to proposals for electronic-only 
shareholder meetings.192  Shareholder advocates argue that remote meet-
ings run counter to the primary benefits of face-to face meetings: the 
ability to directly interact with the board and management.193  Sharehold-
ers also express concern that remote interactions would enable the board 
and management to ignore difficult issues.194  Indeed, corporations that 
host remote meetings do emphasize the fact that they could not guaran-
tee that they would address all shareholder questions during the meet-
ing.195  This fed shareholder fears that management would ignore share-
holder concerns or otherwise only respond to favorable inquiries.196  




 188. See Julie Jones & Cynthia McMakin, Is Your Company Tweeting Towards Trouble?—Twitter 
and Securities Law Compliance, 23 INSIGHTS 19, 20 (2009) (noting that companies primarily use tweet-
ing for marketing, advertising, and disseminating information). 
 189. See Lisa M. Fairfax, Virtual Shareholder Meetings Reconsidered, 40 SETON HALL L. REV. 
1367, 1368 (2010) [hereinafter VSM]. 
 190. See id. at 1388. 
 191. See id. 
 192. See id. at 1392–93, 1396. 
 193. See Boros, supra note 165, at 268; see also VSM, supra note 189, at 1391. 
 194. See VSM, supra note 189, at 1392. 
 195. See id. at 1388. 
 196. See id. at 1392. 
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few corporations relying on such meetings.197  Shareholders do not view 
such meetings as a substitute for genuine interaction with the board.   
6. Informal Interactions 
Board-shareholder engagement can occur informally, such as 
through brief phone calls, email exchanges, or even short meetings.  
Studies indicate that corporations do informally interact with their 
shareholders.  Such interactions may be more productive because they 
allow shareholders and corporate officials to speak outside of the spot-
light, and in a more casual manner.198  Such interactions also can occur 
more frequently because they can occur without the trappings of, includ-
ing the preparation related to, a formal meeting.  These informal interac-
tions have drawbacks, however, and are insufficient on their own to en-
sure meaningful board-shareholder dialogue.  There is the possibility that 
their more casual nature may increase the likelihood that directors and 
others who engage in such interactions do not do so with the appropriate 
planning and care necessary for all board-shareholder engagement.199  
Moreover, it is likely that corporate officials cannot delve into more seri-
ous governance issues during informal exchanges because of their rela-
tive brevity and casualness.  From this perspective, it is likely that infor-
mal interactions can serve as a supplement to more formal 
engagements—providing an important starting point, laying important 
groundwork, or enabling brief follow-ups—but cannot supplant those 
engagements.200  Perhaps most critically, it is less likely that such informal 
interactions can occur at the board level simply because board members 
are part-time, and thus may not have the time to engage in these more 
routine and casual exchanges.201  Indeed, studies reveal that informal in-
teractions do not often occur with directors.202  In fact, even during the 
annual meeting, only a small portion of interactions occur via one-on-one 
meetings between directors and shareholders.203  This suggests that such 
information exchanges may be rare and limited in their ability to facili-
tate constructive dialogue.  Importantly, this Article distinguishes be-
tween informal interactions and private meetings.  Under this Article’s 
view, such interactions involve brief, more casual, exchanges with share-
holders.  By contrast, private meetings are more structured and formal.  
Such meetings not only may be productive because they occur behind 
 
 197. See id. at 1396. 
 198. See Joseph W. Yockey, On the Role and Regulation of Private Negotiations in Governance, 61 
S.C. L. REV. 171, 171–72 (2009) (emphasizing the importance of private negotiations); GOLDSTEIN, 
supra note 112, at 9 (noting sentiment regarding the relative effectiveness of private meetings). 
 199. See supra notes 119–124 and accompanying text. 
 200. See GOLDSTEIN, supra note 112, at 12 (noting that some sixty percent of engagement with 
companies starts with a telephone call). 
 201. See SPENCER STUART, supra note 135, at 14. 
 202. See GOLDSTEIN, supra note 112, at 15. 
 203. See SHAW, supra note 124, at 38. 
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closed doors, but also are precisely the forms of engagement advocated 
by this Article. 
7. Concluding Assessment 
The various limitations to effective communication associated with 
the current communication regime mean that a different approach may 
be necessary for boards and shareholders to reap the benefits of con-
structive engagement.  The next Section examines potential approaches 
and the board’s role in determining their viability. 
B. New Avenues of Engagement 
A variety of different alternatives have been proposed for enhanc-
ing meaningful discussion between directors and shareholders.  This Sec-
tion examines some of the most prevalent. 
1. The Fifth Analyst Call 
In 2010, a group of institutional investors began requesting that sev-
eral corporations host a “Fifth Analyst” call.204  A Fifth Analyst call re-
fers to a dedicated teleconference with shareholders focused exclusively 
on governance issues.205  Under the proposal, either the independent 
board chair or the lead director would be required to participate in the 
call, while board committee chairs also would be encouraged to partici-
pate.206  The agenda would be agreed upon in advance, but would revolve 
around matters covered in the proxy statement.207  The call would occur 
after publication of the proxy statement, but prior to the annual meet-
ing.208  In April 2011, Occidental Petroleum Corporation became the 
first—and to date the only—corporation to host such a call.209 
The primary benefit of such calls is that they would enable board-
shareholder communication outside of, and prior to, the annual meeting.  
Thus, the hope is that such calls would allow directors and shareholders 
to exchange their thoughts and insights regarding important governance 
 
 204. See ALEXIS KRAJESKI ET AL., REQUEST FOR INVESTOR DIALOGUE: FIFTH ANALYST CALL 
ON CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND THE PROXY STATEMENT (2010) [hereinafter REQUEST FOR 
INVESTOR DIALOGUE], available at http://www.shareholderforum.com/e-mtg/Library/20101201_Fifth 
Analyst.pdf; David A. Katz, Investor Communication and “Fifth Analyst Call,” HARV. L. SCH. F. ON 
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG. (Feb. 15, 2011, 9:13 AM), http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/corp 
gov/2011/02/15/investor-communication-and-fifth-analyst-call/.  Such calls would be in addition to the 
quarterly analyst calls that corporations routinely host after they have released their quarterly finan-
cial results. 
 205. See Katz, supra note 204. 
 206. See id. 
 207. See REQUEST FOR INVESTOR DIALOGUE, supra note 204, at 3. 
 208. See id. at 1. 
 209. See Shanny Basar, Occidental Petroleum Hosts ‘Fifth Analyst Call’, FIN. NEWS (April 7, 
2011), http://www.efinancialnews.com/story/2011-04-07/occidental-fifth-call. 
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matters.210  Because they predate the annual meeting and proxy voting, 
such calls also are designed to allow the board to further explain their 
positions to shareholders, or otherwise address any shareholder concerns 
prior to the shareholder vote.211 
Critics raise several concerns regarding the Fifth Analyst call.212  
First, it is possible that such a call would be redundant because issues in 
the proxy statement are covered extensively by the proxy statement.213  
Of course, the fact that the proxy statement addresses an issue does not 
necessarily mean that the issue has been addressed in a clear manner, or 
otherwise in a manner that would alleviate shareholder concerns, par-
ticularly if corporations have not engaged their shareholders and hence 
do not have a sufficient understanding of shareholder concerns.  A sec-
ond concern relates specifically to directors’ participation.  Critics insist 
that it would place an undue and unfair burden on directors to require 
them to speak to the wide range of issues raised by the proxy statement, 
particularly when such directors do not participate in drafting the proxy 
statement.214  On the one hand, there does appear to be a wide range of 
topics about which investors would like directors to address during the 
Fifth Analyst call,215 which raises concerns about directors’ capacity to ef-
fectively engage.216  On the other hand, not only is there a growing expec-
tation that directors be familiar with information in their company’s 
proxy statement, but also directors can shape the agenda to include only 
those items that are appropriate for board-level discussions.217  The po-
tential breadth of the agenda is thus a concern, but there is a potential to 
minimize that concern.  Relatedly, critics argue that Fifth Analyst calls 
will require directors to expend too much time and resources.218  While 
such a concern can be minimized by curtailing some of the issues to be 
discussed at the meeting, it also must be considered in light of the poten-
tial benefits to be gained. 
There may be additional drawbacks to such calls that have not been 
raised by critics.  Like a virtual shareholder meeting, such calls do not al-
low face-to face interactions.  As a result, it is not clear if they can actual-
ly facilitate direct interaction between directors and shareholders, partic-
 
 210. See REQUEST FOR INVESTOR DIALOGUE, supra note 204, at 1. 
 211. See id. at 3. 
 212. Critics also raise concerns regarding whether such calls would violate Regulation FD. 
 213. See Katz, supra note 204. 
 214. See id. 
 215. See REQUEST FOR INVESTOR DIALOGUE, supra note 204, at 2–3. 
 216. See Katz, supra note 204. 
 217. See REQUEST FOR INVESTOR DIALOGUE, supra note 204, at 3 (noting that the agenda would 
be agreed upon prior to the meeting). 
 218. See Jeff Cossette, Debate Rages over Fifth Analyst Call, INSIDE INVESTOR RELATIONS (April 
4, 2011), http://www.insideinvestorrelations.com/articles/proxy-voting-annual-meetings/18141/debate-
rages-over-fifth-analyst-call/. 
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ularly if a large group of shareholders participate in the call.219  There also 
is a potential that such calls could become rote and formulaic, undermin-
ing their utility.220  A key criticism of traditional shareholders’ meetings 
and quarterly analysts calls is that they have become too scripted, render-
ing them invaluable.221  From this perspective, there is a danger that once 
a meeting becomes part of a corporation’s routine, it could become high-
ly scripted, and thus not offer shareholders and directors any meaningful 
opportunity to hold a constructive conversation. 
2. Shareholder Governance Meetings 
A shareholder governance meeting refers to a meeting between the 
board and shareholders outside of the annual meeting.222  Proposals with 
respect to such meetings run the gamut.  Some have suggested that inves-
tors meet with particular board committees.223  Others have proposed 
that the corporation host an “investor day,” whereby board members in-
vite shareholders to engage with them.224  Still others have proposed that 
corporations meet routinely with their large investors.225  In fact, Pfizer 
became the first company to announce its intention to meet with its larg-
est shareholders on a more routine basis.226  Pfizer then held one meeting 
with thirty of its largest investors; a handful of other companies followed 
Pfizer’s lead and held such meetings as well.227 
Like the Fifth Analyst call, such meetings have potential benefits 
and drawbacks.  Such meetings would enable directors to interact with 
shareholders and potentially exchange perspective and insights regarding 
critical corporate governance issues.228  Because the meetings would oc-
cur in person, there may be a greater potential for constructive dia-
logue.229  Still, these meetings raise concerns with respect to resources 
and costs as well as the possibility that they would lose their utility by be-
coming mechanical and scripted.230 
 
 219. See REQUEST FOR INVESTOR DIALOGUE, supra note 204, at 2.  Meetings will be held by con-
ference calls or conducted virtually.  Thus, there is a potential that communication may be hampered, 
particularly if large numbers of shareholders participate. 
 220. See ViewPoints, supra note 4, at 3; Hagberg, supra note 126, at 26. 
 221. See ViewPoints, supra note 4, at 3; Hagberg, supra note 126, at 26. 
 222. See ViewPoints, supra note 4, at 8–9. 
 223. See id. at 9. 
 224. See id. at 8–9. 
 225. See id. at 9. 
 226. See SHAREHOLDER DEMOCRACY, supra note 1, at 124. 
 227. Id. 
 228. See REQUEST FOR INVESTOR DIALOGUE, supra note 204, at 1. 
 229. See Boros, supra note 165, at 260 (pinpointing the benefits of face-to-face meetings). 
 230. See ViewPoints, supra note 4, at 3; Hagberg, supra note 126, at 6. 
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3. Structural Changes 
Some have suggested facilitating board-shareholder communication 
by making structural changes to the board itself.231  Such changes include 
the creation of a new board committee responsible for shareholder rela-
tions as well as creation of an advisory committee comprised of share-
holders and other interested parties whose task would be to provide in-
sight to the board with respect to important governance issues.232 
One benefit of these kinds of structural changes is that they may 
signal to shareholders that the corporation places a high priority on 
shareholder engagement.233  Similar to the creation of other committees, 
such changes may enhance directors’ ability to oversee the corporation’s 
engagement efforts, giving directors a greater ability to monitor and co-
ordinate with other actors responsible for shareholder engagement.234 
Some may view the addition of yet another board committee as un-
necessary.  Moreover, these structural changes do not appear to serve as 
a substitute for other mechanisms.  Instead, they may best be viewed as a 
coordinating vehicle for these other mechanisms. 
4. Board Discretion 
In addition to their costs and benefits, each of these mechanisms 
raises a host of issues that must be resolved.  For example, should share-
holder engagements be public or private, or some combination thereof?  
There are at least two benefits of a private meeting; both shareholders 
and directors may be able to speak more candidly, and such a meeting 
may be more conducive to constructive dialogue.235  Indeed, the more 
people involved, the less likely that constructive dialogue can occur.236  
Yet private meetings pose their own set of challenges.  There is a greater 
risk of violating Regulation FD.237  Private meetings also raise concerns 
regarding transparency.  Indeed, the Fifth Analyst call held by Occi-
dental was private and was sharply criticized on the basis of its lack of 
transparency.238  Second, if the meeting is private, who should be allowed 
to participate in such meetings or calls?  Potential attendees include both 
 
 231. See Dangerous Talk, supra note 3, at 2; ViewPoints, supra note 4, at 9. 
 232. See Dangerous Talk, supra note 3, at 2 (noting that UnitedHealth group had established an 
advisory committee to allow shareholders to suggest new directors). 
 233. See Corporate Director’s Guidebook, supra note 151, at 1012–13 (explaining the importance 
of committees to board governance). 
 234. See id. at 1016–22 (explaining the coordination and monitoring function of audit commit-
tees). 
 235. See Yockey, supra note 198, at 171–72 (emphasizing the importance of private negotiations); 
see also GOLDSTEIN, supra note 112, at 9 (noting sentiment regarding the relative effectiveness of pri-
vate meetings). 
 236. See Yockey, supra note 198, at 171–72; see also GOLDSTEIN, supra note 112, at 9. 
 237. See Yockey, supra note 198, at 210. 
 238. See ViewPoints, supra note 4, at 8 (noting that the Occidental call would have been improved 
through more transparency). 
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institutional and retail investors as well as proxy advisors and other mar-
ket participants that influence shareholder voting.  A limitation geared at 
institutional investors or large investors increases the likelihood that par-
ticipants would have a significant and long-term interest in the corpora-
tion, but some corporations have large retail investor bases that should 
not be ignored.239  Muddling the picture still further, directors must con-
sider whether and to what extent boards should include representatives 
from proxy advisory firms in the meeting.240  Third, how frequently 
should such meetings occur?  Fourth, which member or members of the 
board should participate?  These and other issues must be properly re-
solved to ensure that any engagement is effective, which suggests that di-
rectors should be involved in the decision regarding the appropriate form 
of engagement. 
Ultimately, there is no one size fits all model of engagement be-
cause they all involve trade-offs that the corporation should carefully 
consider.  The board is likely in the best position to balance those 
tradeoffs. 
C. Considering a Mandate 
Many boards appear reluctant to move beyond the status quo with 
regard to shareholder engagement.241  While some of the reluctance is 
understandable, it is also possible that boards are allowing a general 
aversion to engagement to outweigh a proper assessment of the costs and 
benefits of such engagement.  Thus, surveyed directors and investors 
have expressed concern that some directors and managers have a mind-
set against engagement that impedes their ability to have constructive 
discussions about the topic.242  In a recent study of engagement, while on-
ly a small number of respondents would “go so far as to accuse [boards 
and managers] of being generally unwilling to engage,” nearly thirty per-
cent of respondents cited “philosophical considerations,” such as en-
trenched management, as an obstacle to engagement.243  While some re-
spondents expressed satisfaction with their access to directors, the survey 
highlighted the fact that a number expressed frustration with such access, 
while noting a “widespread perception” that management often acted as 
 
 239. Realistically, however, it may be difficult to host an efficient meeting if the entire retail in-
vestor base is included in the discussions.  And corporations may legitimately contend that, in light of 
such difficulties, retail investors should be excluded from these special governance meetings and thus 
limited to raising concerns at the annual meeting.  A potential middle ground could be to enable the 
board to limit participants to a certain number of institutional investors, while either allowing retail 
investors to listen to the meeting or distributing to such investors a transcript of the meeting.   
 240. Although some corporations and investors note that one of the benefits of board-
shareholder communication may be that it enables directors and shareholders to talk directly to one 
another, without going through an intermediary.  Hence, the proposal for a Fifth Analyst call specifi-
cally excludes proxy advisors.  See REQUEST FOR INVESTOR DIALOGUE, supra note 204, at 3. 
 241. See Breheny, supra note 6, at 3. 
 242. See ViewPoints, supra note 4, at 6. 
 243. See GOLDSTEIN, supra note 112, at 21. 
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a “gatekeeper,” whose mission was to keep shareholders away from di-
rectors.244  As a result, it is entirely possible that some directors simply 
will not enhance their engagement efforts even when there may be clear 
benefits to such engagement, and even when the failure to engage causes 
the corporation and its shareholders to incur unnecessary costs.245 
In light of this possibility, to the extent that constructive communi-
cation between directors and shareholders is vital, we may need to con-
sider measures beyond mere encouragement.  Such measures can take a 
variety of different forms, and could stem from a variety of different 
sources. 
On one end of the spectrum are proposals that would give share-
holders the ability to require engagement.  For example, one possibility 
is that corporations could be required to host a special governance meet-
ing when a specified number of shareholders request such a meeting.  At 
least one institutional investor has advanced such a proposal.246  To be 
sure, determining an optimal ownership threshold for shareholders who 
make such a request would prove challenging.  The optimal level is one 
that is not preclusive, but ensures that the ability to call a special govern-
ance meeting is utilized only by shareholders with significant and long 
term-interests in the corporation.247  In the context of shareholder pro-
posals related to special meetings, while corporations appear to prefer a 
higher threshold such as twenty-five percent or more, shareholders have 
advocated lower thresholds, with ten percent being the threshold gener-
ating the strongest amount of shareholder support.248  Despite disagree-
ment with respect to the threshold, in the special meeting context, corpo-
rations have recognized the importance of hosting a meeting once a 
significant number of shareholders indicate their desire to call the meet-
ing.249  Thus, there is some recognition that requiring a meeting with 
shareholders is appropriate once a sufficient number of shareholders ex-
press their desire for such a meeting. 
 
 244. See id. 
 245. See ViewPoints, supra note 4, at 25 (noting that “the current paradigm of board-shareholder 
engagement fails both boards and shareholders”). 
 246. See Breheny, supra note 6, at 2. 
 247. See Facilitating Shareholder Director Nominations, Securities Act Release No. 9136, Ex-
change Act Release No. 62,764, Investment Company Act Release No. 29, 384, 75 Fed. Reg. 56,668 
(Sept. 16, 2010) (discussing the purpose of ownership thresholds, and noting one experts comment that 
“only those long-term shareholders who are seriously concerned about the governance of portfolio 
companies will have a seat at the table”). 
 248. See Richard Sandler & Elizabeth Weinstein, Spotlight on Shareholder Proposals: Special 
Meetings, DAVIS POLK (July 30, 2012, 11:15 AM), http://www.davispolk.com/briefing/corporate 
governance/blog.aspx?entry=201; see also SULLIVAN & CROMWELL LLP, 2012 PROXY SEASON 
REVIEW 4-6 (2012) [hereinafter 2012 PROXY SEASON REVIEW], available at http://www.sullcrom.com/ 
files/Publication/fdd28332-7b79-4d37-9ada-89da9bc111a9/Presentation/PublicationAttachment/d54685 
8a-ee4a-43af-b379-170d4995e41c/2012_Proxy_Season_Review-7-20-2012.pdf. 
 249. 2012 PROXY SEASON REVIEW, supra note 248 (noting proposals by Vanguard and T. Rowe 
Price). 
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This proposal has clear drawbacks along with potential benefits.  
With respect to drawbacks, a proposal that augments shareholder power 
in this area could be viewed as objectionable on its face because it fur-
ther shifts the balance of power away from boards.  It is possible, howev-
er, that such a proposal could be deemed appropriate because it gives 
shareholders the ability to influence the decision regarding what consti-
tutes an optimal level and mix of engagement.  In addition to concerns 
about resources and inappropriate use by shareholders seeking to ad-
vance their own agenda, implementation of such a proposal involves sev-
eral resource and other logistical hurdles (particularly resolution of the 
ownership trigger) that could prove insurmountable.  By contrast, one 
important benefit of such a proposal is that it would not require corpora-
tions to hold a meeting every year.250  Instead, it enables shareholders to 
opt into a meeting when other forms of communication have not been 
deemed sufficient.251  This therefore could be viewed as a soft mandate, 
as well as one that is consistent with private ordering.  Moreover, it is 
possible that such a proposal’s primary benefit would be indirect.  In 
other words, the shareholder power to call a special governance meeting 
may be sufficient to induce directors to proactively reach out to, and en-
gage with, shareholders to avoid the necessity of such a meeting.  From 
this perspective, one of the primary benefits would be to alter director 
behavior with respect to engagement, particularly with regard to those 
directors who may be opposed to such engagement based on rigid atti-
tudes against dialogue with shareholders. 
On the other end of the spectrum are proposals related to the SEC.  
For example, the SEC could require disclosure on whether and to what 
extent corporations engaged in outreach beyond traditional channels.252  
The SEC has adopted disclosure requirements in an effort to influence 
corporate conduct,253 and has experienced some success.254  Such a disclo-
sure rule may be sufficient to incentivize companies to enhance their en-
gagement.  There are costs and unintended consequences associated with 
regulation by disclosure.255  This disclosure approach, however, may be 
the most practical and desirable first step when considering how best the 
 
 250. See Breheny, supra note 6, at 2.  The proposal enables shareholders to call a special govern-
ance meeting whenever they deem appropriate—and they meeting the threshold requirements—and 
thus such meetings are not required to occur annually. 
 251. See id.  Shareholders presumably would call such meetings at their discretion, and likely once 
other methods of communication have fallen short of resolving the issues or issues of concern. 
 252. Such a rule could be crafted similar to the SEC’s recent rule related to disclosure on board 
diversity, that requires corporations to disclose “whether, and if so, how” the nominating committee 
considers board diversity.  See Lisa M. Fairfax, Board Diversity Revisited: New Rationale, Same Old 
Story?, 89 N.C. L. REV. 855, 866–67 (2011) [hereinafter Board Diversity Revisited].  The rule can be 
found at Corporate Governance, 17 C.F.R. § 229.407(c)(2)(vi) (2012). 
 253. See Cynthia A. Williams, The Securities and Exchange Commission and Corporate Social 
Transparency, 112 HARV. L. REV. 1197, 1270 (1999). 
 254. See Board Diversity Revisited, supra note 252, at 873–74. 
 255. See Geoffrey A. Manne, The Hydraulic Theory of Disclosure Regulation and Other Costs of 
Disclosure, 58 ALA. L. REV. 473 (2007). 
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SEC can better ensure that corporations are willing to embrace board-
shareholder engagement because it falls short of mandating a corporate 
governance change, and thus may be deemed a more moderate reform. 
There may be a wide range of objections to each of these proposals, 
or any other that does more than seek to encourage board-shareholder 
engagement.  Most notably, some may insist that board-shareholder en-
gagement will reach optimal levels without the need for the imposition of 
mandates.  While studies with respect to increased levels of engagement 
may support this insistence,256 other indicators suggest that some corpora-
tions may prove unwilling to engage despite its benefits.257  To the extent 
this is a valid suggestion, proposals that aim to better incentivize board-
shareholder engagement should at least be discussed.  Indeed, given their 
increased ability to influence board elections and corporate policy, the 
failure to respond to shareholder frustrations in this area could have re-
percussions in other areas. 
CONCLUSION 
Shareholders’ increased influence over corporate affairs has made 
board-shareholder engagement a corporate governance priority.  Even 
once reluctant and resistant corporate directors and officers are begin-
ning to realize the importance of outreach efforts involving directors and 
shareholders.  This Article confirms the importance of board-
shareholder engagement.  Indeed, this Article argues that both the costs 
and the risks of board-shareholder engagement may have been vastly 
overstated, and that the benefits to be gained may be well worth the 
costs.  This Article also identifies the shortcomings of the existing com-
munication channels, and therefore argues for the adoption of alternative 
models of communication. 
This Article further argues for consideration of proposals that 
would do more than merely confirm or encourage the benefits of board-
shareholder engagement.  Indeed, evidence suggests that at least some 
boards appear to be extremely reluctant to meaningfully enhance their 
interactions with shareholders, particularly with regard to engagement 
beyond traditional settings.  This reluctance is unfortunate because it 
means that directors, and by extension the corporation, are missing out 
on a critical opportunity to better address shareholder concerns, better 
educate the shareholder base, better understand future issues, better re-
spond to shareholder activism, and ultimately avoid contentious share-
holder battles that often stem from lack of communication or miscom-
munication.  As a result, this Article contends that we should consider 
reforms that would require or at least better incentivize boards to engage 
with shareholders.  While such an action may seem costly and even risky 
 
 256. See ALLEN, supra note 19, at 12. 
 257. See supra notes 244–248 and accompanying text. 
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at first glance, in the long run it may be riskier to allow some corpora-
tions to opt out of engagement and the corresponding benefits that flow 
from it. 
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